Division into lots and SME participation in public procurement by Egeberg, Silje Hegdalsaune
Division into lots and SME participation in 
public procurement 
 
 Does Article 46 of the new Directive 2014/24/EU achieve its 




Candidate number: 76 
 
 
















JUS399 Master thesis  
 







1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 3 
1.1 Background .................................................................................................................. 3 
1.2 Purpose and research questions ................................................................................. 4 
1.3 Demarcation ................................................................................................................. 5 
1.4 Method and material ................................................................................................... 5 
1.5 Disposition .................................................................................................................... 7 
2 Small and medium-sized enterprises ................................................................................ 8 
2.1 Introduction and definition ......................................................................................... 8 
2.2 Facilitating SMEs in public procurement ................................................................. 9 
2.2.1 SMEs participation as an objective ......................................................................... 9 
2.2.2 The benefits of SME participation ........................................................................ 10 
2.2.2.1 SMEs importance at EU level ......................................................................... 10 
2.2.2.2 SMEs importance in Norway .......................................................................... 12 
2.2.3 The disadvantages of SMEs .................................................................................. 12 
2.2.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 13 
2.3 The barriers to SME participation in public procurement ................................... 14 
3 Dividing contracts into lots to facilitate SMEs .............................................................. 15 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 15 
3.2 Lot division as a SME vehicle ................................................................................... 16 
3.3 Risks generated by dividing contracts into lots ...................................................... 17 
3.3.1 Interference with competition ............................................................................... 17 
3.3.2 Bid rigging ............................................................................................................ 17 
3.3.3 Lot division may not be feasible ........................................................................... 19 
3.3.4 Increased costs and complication of the procurement procedure ......................... 19 
3.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 19 
4 The effects of Article 46 on SME participation ............................................................. 20 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 20 
4.2 Presentation of Article 46 .......................................................................................... 21 
4.2.1 The legislative process .......................................................................................... 21 
4.2.2 The final outcome of Article 46 ............................................................................ 22 
4.3 Does Article 46 achieve its goal of promoting SMEs? ............................................ 23 
	 2	
4.3.1 General remarks .................................................................................................... 23 
4.3.2 The obligation to provide a justification ............................................................... 24 
4.3.2.1 The requiremnt of ‘indication of the main reasons’ ........................................ 25 
4.3.2.2 The principle of good administration .............................................................. 29 
4.3.2.3 The fundamental market freedoms .................................................................. 30 
4.3.2.4 The principle of competition ........................................................................... 31 
4.3.2.5 Conclusion on the effects of the remedies ...................................................... 32 
4.4 Reflections .................................................................................................................. 33 
5 The Norwegian proposal on lot division ......................................................................... 34 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 34 
5.2 Current public procurement legislation .................................................................. 34 
5.3 Presentation and general remarks on the lot division proposal ............................ 35 
5.4 The requirement of ‘kort begrunnelse’ ................................................................... 36 
5.5 Brief comparison to other Member States .............................................................. 38 
5.6 Reflections .................................................................................................................. 39 
6 Concluding remarks ......................................................................................................... 40 







Each year, contracting authorities spend about 19 per cent of the EU gross domestic product 
on purchasing supplies, services and works, which corresponds to approximately EUR 2.4 
trillion.1 Thus, winning public contracts is an important source of revenue for all businesses in 
Europe, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  
 
Despite their small size, the benefits of SMEs have been highlighted on several occasions. 
They are regarded as the backbone of the European economy, and have potential for job 
creation, growth and innovation.2 Also, SME participation in public procurement is 
considered important as it causes increases competition leading to better value for money for 
contracting authorities.3 
 
However, SMEs struggle to establish themselves in the public procurement market and are 
underrepresented in procurements above EU thresholds, because their size is not compatible 
to large-scale contracts.4  
 
This issue was taken into account in the Commission’s proposal on new public procurement 
regulations5 as part of the motivation to modernise the public procurement directives was to 
make public contracts more accessible for SMEs.6 Among the measures taken to achieve that 
aim was to invite contracting authorities to divide contracts into lots.7 This proposal resulted 
																																																								
1 Cernat and Kutlina-Dimitrova, International Public Procurement: From Scant Facts to Hard Data, 
Chief Economist Note, Issue 1, April 2015, p. 2 
2 Commission Staff Working Document – European Code of Best Practice Facilitating Access by 
SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts, SEC(2008) 2193, p. 4. Henceforth Code of Best Practice; 
European Commission, Green Paper on the Modernisation of EU Public Procurement Policy: 
Towards a More Efficient European Procurement Market, COM(2011) 15 final, p. 27 Henceforth 
Green Paper 
3 Code of Best Practice, p. 2 
4 Loader, “The Challenge of Competitive Procurement: Value for Money Versus Small Business 
Support”, Public Money & Management, 2007, 27:5, pp. 307-314, at p. 310 
5 European Commission, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
public procurement, COM(2011) 896 final 
6 COM(2011) 896 final, p. 10 
7 COM(2011) 896 final, p. 11 
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in Article 46 of the new Public Sector Directive 2014/24/EU,8  which for the first time make  
regulation of lot division part of the public procurement regime. 
 
The concept of dividing contracts into lots is considered an adequate tool to help SMEs 
overcome the obstacles of large public contracts. However, both economic and legal 
literatures have stressed that lot division might risks interfering with competition and facilitate 
bid rigging. It is further submitted that lot division may not always be feasible and that lot 
division requires more resources from contracting authorities. Whether these risks will create 
problems in practice depends largely on the design of Article 46. 
 
Moreover, despite being relatively new and only recently implemented by the Member States, 
the design of Article 46 has already been the subject of criticism. The objection against the lot 
division-rule is that the soft approach9 risks that Article 46 will not achieve its aim of 
promoting SMEs in public procurement. Some have even predicted that Article 46 will 
remain a political flag devoid of content.10  
 
Member States are free to facilitate SME participation further through lot division in their 
national legislation. How Article 46 has been implemented by the Member States will 
therefore largely determine whether the provision will contribute to the success of SMEs in 
public procurement, or whether the provision will remain a political flag, as predicted by legal 
theory.  
 
1.2 Purpose and research questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse Article 46 of the Directive 2014/24 and how the 
provision affects the participation of SMEs in public procurement from a legal standpoint. 
More precisely, this thesis discusses why there is a need to promote SME participation in 
public procurement, the implications of lot division and whether Article 46 is suitable to 
promote SME’s in public procurement. Consequently, my research questions are the 
following: 
																																																								
8 Henceforth Directive 2014/24 
9 Sánchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, 2. Edition, 2015, p. 347; 
Herrera Anchustegui, “Division into Lots and Demand Aggregation – Extremes Looking for the 
Correct Balance?”. In Reform or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules in 2014, Grith 
Skovgaard Ølykke & Albert Sanches-Graells (eds.), 2016 – in press, p. 7. 
10 Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), pp. 7 and 15 
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- What is the rationale justifying SME participation?  
- Why is dividing contracts into lots considered a SME friendly tool and what are the 
risks?  
- What is the legal regime applicable to division of contracts into lots and its 
interpretation?  
- How the provision on division of contracts into lots, and in particular the justification 
required to award a single contract, affects SME participation in public procurement. 
 
1.3 Demarcation 
The thesis excludes the analysis of the Utilities Directive 2014/25/EU Article 65, as this 
directive applies a more light touch regime on public procurement, compared to Directive 
2014/24.11 The Concessions Directive 2014/23/EU is also omitted, since concession contracts 
are characterised by being assigned as an exclusive right and consequently this directive does 
not contain any provision on lot division.  
 
The thesis is therefore limited to analysing the provision on division of contracts into lots in 
the new Public Sector Directive 2014/24/EU, namely Article 46. This thesis will not 
investigate other measures taken the directive to promote SME participation.12  
 
For practical reasons, the material used in this thesis is limited to sources that are available 
through the 20th of May 2016.  
 
1.4 Method and material 
Dividing contracts into lots is regulated in Article 46 and the supplementary recitals in the 
new Public Sector Directive 2014/24. Because Article 46 is new there are currently no 
decisions from the European Court of Justice13 on how the provision shall be understood. 
Consequently, the analysis of the provision will mainly be based on the written legislation in 
																																																								
11 Poulsen, Jakobsen and Kalsmose-Hjelmborg, EU Public Procurement Law, 2. Edition, 2012, p. 140 
12 Other inventions are the European Single Procurement Document in Article 59, limitation of 




Directive 2014/24. However, judgements from the ECJ will be used as inspiration to predict 
what the future possibly holds for Article 46.  
 
Essential to determine the effects of Article 46 on SME participation is how the provision is 
implemented by the Member States in their national legislation. EU directives are binding 
upon the Member States; however, national authorities have discretionary power to choose 
the form and method for the implementation as long as they meet the results set out in the 
directive.14  
 
The 22nd of January this year, the Norwegian Government proposed a new law on public 
procurement, which is currently being considered in the Parliament.15 Norway is party to the 
EEA Agreement and is therefore obliged to comply with EU directives in areas covered by 
the EEA Agreement and implement EEA relevant directives in national legislation.16 
Parliamentary Decision is expected in mid-June and new regulation on public procurement 
will be adopted after the law is passed by the Parliament. The Ministry estimate that 
regulation enters into fore in autumn 2016.17 The regulation will contain the more detailed 
rules on public procurement including a provision regulating lot division.18 Thus, the analysis 
is based on the current proposal for new Regulation on Public Procurement § 14-1.19 
 
For the analysis of § 14.1 (2), the EU directive is relevance, because the provision is set out 
through the EEA Agreement.20 However, considering that § 14-1 is not yet implemented, the 
thesis will not go into depth when analysing this provision. The main purpose of the analysis 
is to gain perspective on the impact of Article 46. On this basis, the thesis will also undertake 
																																																								
14 TFEU Article 288 para 3 
15 Prop. 51 L (2015-2016) - Lov om offentlige anskaffelser (anskaffelsesloven); Regjeringen, Nytt 
anskaffelsesregelverk er underveis 
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/naringsliv/konkurransepolitikk/offentlige-anskaffelser-
listeside/nytt-anskaffelsesregelverk-er-underveis/id2482572/. 
16 EEA Agreement Article 7 
17 Regjeringen, Nytt anskaffelsesregelverk er underveis 
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/naringsliv/konkurransepolitikk/offentlige-anskaffelser-
listeside/nytt-anskaffelsesregelverk-er-underveis/id2482572/.  
18	Prop. 51 L (2015-2016), p. 71	
19 Det Kongelige Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, Høringsnotat 2 – Ny forskrift om offentlige 
anskaffelser, p. 68. Available at 
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/a20179ad1beb4de9b4d7f5ccec80c094/horingsnotat-2-
forskrift-offentlige-anskaffelser.pdf 
20 EEA Agreement Article 65	
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a brief comparison of the implementation of the provision in Denmark, United Kingdom and 
France.  
 
As this thesis investigates various aspects related to the division of the contracts into lots, the 
method and material may vary based on the topic of the discussion. The common 
denominator is the emphasis on legal and economic theory in addition to guiding statements, 
such as from OECD, Communications, Working Documents and Notices from the European 
Commission and Green Papers. However, it is important to bear in mind that these sources are 
not legally binding upon the Member States as they are considered to be soft law.21  
 
1.5 Disposition 
The thesis has initially presented the theme and which legal sources and methods that will be 
used. As mentioned, the theme of the thesis is to establish the rationale behind facilitating 
SMEs in public procurement and whether the provision governing lot division achieves its 
aim of promoting SMEs.  
 
The second chapter investigates the rationale behind facilitating SMEs and the barriers facing 
SMEs in public procurement from an economic perspective.  
 
The third chapter examines the concept of lot division as a SME friendly tool. This chapter 
also investigates the potential risks deriving from lot division.  
 
Chapter four is the core of the thesis. This chapter starts with a presentation of Article 46, 
before evaluating whether the provision will achieve its aim of fostering SME participation. 
The focus of the chapter is on the justification requirement in Article 46.1.  
 
Chapter five analyses the Norwegian proposal on lot division. The chapter also compares this 
proposal to the implementation of Article 46 in other Member States.  
 
The sixth and final chapter accounts for the concluding remarks and reconnects to the 
introductory research questions.  
																																																								
21 Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law, 2004, pp. 123-219 
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2 Small and medium-sized enterprises 
2.1 Introduction and definition 
The aim of dividing contracts into lots is to adapt public procurement to the needs of SMEs.22 
Furthermore, fostering SME participation has been highlighted by the Council as one of the 
five main points of the public procurement reform leading up to the current directive.23 Thus, 
the question arises as to why SME promotion is considered important in public procurement, 
and further why they are striving to establish themselves on the public procurement market.  
 
Before tackling these questions, the term ‘SME’ must be addressed. According to Directive 
2014/24, SMEs shall be understood as defined in the Commission Recommendation.24 This 
instrument defines SMEs based on size and turnover: 
 
- SMEs are enterprises, which employ fewer than 250 persons and have an annual 
turnover of maximum EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not 
exceeding EUR 43 million. 
- Small enterprises are defined as an enterprise, which employs less than 50 persons and 
whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total do not exceed EUR 10 
million.  
- Microenterprises are defined as an enterprise, which employs less than 10 persons and 
whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet do not exceed EUR 2 million.25 
 
According to this definition, SMEs have limited capacity in in terms of both finances and 
manpower, which affects the contractual obligations they are able to undertake and hinders 
their ability to win large and important procurement documents. Given these limitation it is 
interesting that SMEs have received such positive reviews. Thus, section 2.2 discusses why 
SMEs are an important asset in public procurement and furthermore, section 2.3 investigate 
the barriers facing SMEs in public procurement.  
 
																																																								
22 Directive 2014/24, recital 78 
23 The Council, Press Release – Council adopts directives for the reform of public procurement, 
6337/14, 2014, p. 2 
24 Directive 2014/24, Article 83.3; Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the 
definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, 2003/361/EC, O.J L 124. Hereafter referred 
to as the Commission Recommendation	
25 Commission Recommendation, Annex 1, Article 2 
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2.2 Facilitating SMEs in public procurement 
 
2.2.1 SMEs participation as an objective  
Before analysing the benefits of SMEs, it is appropriate to place SMEs among the EU public 
procurement objectives.  
 
EU public procurement has been institutionalized to achieve what are referred to as vertical 
and horizontal objectives. The vertical objective refers to the specific function of public 
procurement, which is the procurement of supplies, services or works by a contracting 
authority to carry out its tasks.26 For example, a health authority buys surgical supplies to 
provide health services.27  
 
Horizontal policies refer to the policies promoting societal objectives that are not necessary to 
achieve the functional objective.28 They are often referred to as secondary policies, however, 
this term is unfortunate since it assumes that it assumes the prior existence of decisions 
concerning the levels of purchasing, that these policies are of secondary or limited importance 
or irrational.29 Consequently, the term horizontal is used in the following. 
 
SME promotion is classified as a horizontal objective.30 However, as shall be seen in the 
discussion below, fostering SME participation as a separate policy may also benefit other 
horizontal policies in public procurement – which are established as equally important in EU 
public procurement as the mere function of acquiring supplies, services or works. Also, SME 
promotion contributes to achieve other goals in public procurement. 
 
																																																								
26 Arrowsmith and Kunzlik “Public procurement and horizontal policies in EC law: general 
principles”. In: Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law – New Directives and New 
Directions, Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik (eds.), 2009, p. 13 
27 Arrowsmith and Kunzlik (2009), p. 13 
28 Arrowsmith and Kunzlik (2009), pp. 12-13	
29 Arrowsmith and Kunzlik (2009), pp. 13-15 
30 Hatzis, ”The legality of SME development policies under EC law”. In: Social and Environmental 
Policies in EC Procurement Law – New Directives and New Directions, Sue Arrowsmith and Peter 
Kunzlik (eds.), 2009, p. 345; Trybus, “The Promotion of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in 
Public Procurement: A Strategic Objective of the New Public Sector Directive?” In Modernising 
Public Procurement: The New Directive, François Lichère, Robert Caranta and Steen Treumer (eds.), 
2014, p. 256; Sánchez Graells (2015), pp. 102-103  
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2.2.2 The benefits of SME participation 
 
2.2.2.1 SMEs importance at EU level 
 
SMEs are often recognised as the backbone of the European economy.31 Also, the Code of 
Best Practice sums up the rationale behind facilitating SMEs in the public procurement 
market as follows: 
 
“An increased involvement of SMEs into public purchasing will result in higher 
competition for public contracts, leading to better value for money for contracting 
authorities. In addition to this, more competitive and transparent public procurement 
practices will allow SMEs to unlock their growth and innovation potential with a 
positive impact on the European economy”.32 
 
According to this statement, SMEs are of strategic importance in both EU public procurement 
and the EU economy.  
 
Firstly, the vast majority of businesses in Europe are SMEs, representing 99.8 per cent of all 
enterprises in the non-financial business sector.33 SMEs produce more than half of the EU 
gross domestic product by adding 58 per cent of the gross value in the sector.34 Thus, 
achieving a higher level of SME participation in public procurement has a positive impact on 
the EU economy.35  
 
Secondly, SMEs provide economic stability even during the time of economic crisis.36 For 
example, although the gross value added by SMEs declined after the financial crisis in 2008, 
																																																								
31	Code of Best Practice, p. 4	
32 Code of Best Practice, p. 2	
33 CARSA, PwC Luxembourg, Innova SpA, The University of Manchester, Manchester Institute of 
Innovation Research et. al., Annual Report on European SMEs 2014/2015 - SMEs start hiring again, 
Report prepared for the Commission, 2015, p. 3. Henceforth SMEs start hiring again 
34 SMEs start hiring again, p. 3; PwC, ICF and Ecorys, SMEs access to public procurement markets 
SMEs access to public procurement markets and aggregation of demand in the EU, Study prepared for 
the European Commission, 2014, pp. 5 and 25. Henceforth SMEs access to public procurement 
35 Green Paper, p. 27.  
36 Burgi, “Small and medium-sized enterprises and procurement law – European legal framework and 
German experiences”, Public Procurement Law Review, 2007, 16, pp. 284-294, on p. 259  
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SMEs recovered after 2009.37 It also appears that SMEs did not suffer equally to larger 
enterprises after the financial crisis: according to a survey in United Kingdom, 28 per cent of 
SMEs reported that their turnover exceeded their pre-crisis turnover, while 34 per cent 
reported that their turnover had remained the same.38 
 
Thirdly, SME promotion contributes to protect and expand the labour market in Europe. 
SMEs already employ 67 per cent of the EU population, representing approximately 90 
million jobs.39 Furthermore, SMEs create considerably more employment than large 
companies.40 In fact, SMEs accounted for 71.4 per cent of the increase in the non-financial 
business sector’s employment in 2014.41 This makes SMEs a vital asset for Europe’s many 
unemployed seeking work. 
 
Fourthly, SME participation has positive effects on competition, which is considered one of 
the primary goals of public procurement.42 A higher SME participation increases the 
competition for public contracts by broadening the potential provider base over time.43 
Increased competition leads to better value for money and efficiency of public spending, 
which is highlighted in Directive 2014/24.44 
 
Lastly, by increasing the number of competitors in the relevant market, SMEs have a tendency 
to create innovation.45 SMEs  tend to have a simpler organisation and less bureaucratic 
structure, which makes them more flexible and allow for them to adapt and respond to the 
needs in the market.46 Innovation drives economic growth while it improves the efficiency 
																																																								
37 Wymenga, Spanikova, Barker, Konings, and Canton, EU SMEs in 2012: at the crossroads - Annual 
report on small and medium-sized enterprises in the EU, 2011/12, Report for the European 
Commission, 2012, pp. 9-10 
38 BIS, BIS Small Business Survey 2010, 2011, p. 1  
39 SMEs start hiring again, p. 7	
40 Trybus (2014), p. 257 for further references 
41 SMEs start hiring again, p. 3 
42 Burgi (2007), p. 285; Trybus (2014), p. 259; Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 101 
43 Hatzis (2009), p. 346; COM(2011) 896 final, p. 11 
44 Directive 2014/24, recital 2; Trybus (2014), p. 259; Sànchez Graells (2015), p. 105 
45 Burgi (2007), p. 285; Georghiou, Edler, Uyarra and Yeow, ”Policy instruments for public 
procurement of innovation: Choice, design and assessment”, Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change - An International Journal, 86, 2014, pp. 1–12, at p. 4 
46 Hatzis (2009), p. 346 for further references 
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and quality of public services in addition to achieving value for money.47 Innovation is 
therefore among the horizontal objectives in public procurement.48 
 
2.2.2.2 SMEs importance in Norway 
 
The advantages of SMEs in Norwegian economy and public procurement are analogue to the 
benefits they impose at EU level. However, there are some aspects of SMEs impact in the 
Norwegian economy that calls for a brief review. 
 
The public sector represents a large market in Norway. In 2014, public authorities purchased 
supplies, services and works for NOK 462 billion, which equals approximately EUR 49,8 
billion.49 Thus, getting assignments from the public constitutes an important source of 
revenue for enterprises.  
 
According to the Commission’s SBA Sheet,50 SMEs make up 99,8 per cent of all Norwegian 
enterprises and account for about 68 per cent of all employment in the Norwegian business 
economy, which is only 1 percentage point higher than the EU average.51 However, the value 
added generated by SMEs in Norway is significantly higher than the EU average.52 This 
implies that SMEs play a more important part in Norwegian economy, compared to their 
contributions at EU level.   
 
2.2.3 The disadvantages of SMEs 
Despite the abovementioned advantages of SMEs, they also have some disadvantages, which 
may indicate that SMEs should not be promoted in public procurement.  
 
																																																								
47 Directive 2014/24, recital 47 
48 Sánchez Graells (2015), pp. 102-103 
49 See procurement statistics at http://www.ssb.no/offentlig-sektor/statistikker/offinnkj; Based on 







The first objection is that SMEs are not necessarily the most efficient firms because they have 
less opportunity to generate economies of scale53 and finance innovation due to their size 
compared to larger enterprises.54 However, this does not imply that all SMEs are not efficient 
or innovative. It is submitted by OECD that new technologies reduce the importance of 
economies of scale in every aspect.55 Furthermore, innovation is not dependent on economies 
of scale and financing, as flexibility also facilitates innovation.56 
 
The second objection is that too much SME participation in public procurement involves the 
use of further expenditures due to the need to evaluate tenders. Public authorities arguably 
have an interest in avoiding excessive use of resources during the procurement procedure due 
to their limitations on budgets and administrative resources. An excessive use of resources to 
evaluate tenders contradicts the aim of ensuring the most efficient use of public funds and 




Promoting SMEs has positive effects on the European economy due to their value creation, 
economic stability and contribution to the labour market. Meanwhile, SME participation 
benefits public procurement by increasing the competition, which leads to more efficient 
spending and value for money. Also, SMEs innovative tendencies are equally important to the 
European economy and public procurement.58  
 
As mentioned, the objection that not all SMEs are efficient does not imply that SMEs should 
not be promoted in public procurement. Thus, the remaining objection is the expenditures 
imposed on public authorities due to the need to evaluate more tenders. However, this concern 
relates to an excess amount of SMEs in public procurement. The key is to strike a balance 









57 Directive 2014/24, recital 2 
58 Directive 2014/24, recital 47 
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balanced SME participation will increase the competition over time, which will lead to better 
value for money.59  
 
In summary, easier access to the public procurement market helps SMEs reach their potentials 
of growth, job creation and innovation while achieving greater competition for public 
contracts.60 SME participation in public procurement should therefore be encouraged. 
 
2.3 The barriers to SME participation in public procurement 
Despite SMEs overall potential, they are underrepresented in public procurement, at least in 
procurements above EU- thresholds.61 This underrepresentation arguably deprives the 
European economy and the public procurement market from the benefits deriving from SME 
participation. Thus, this section examines why there is a need to promote SMEs in public 
procurement through dividing contracts into lots. 
 
A study prepared for the Commission concerning SMEs access to public procurement does 
not reveal a significant difference between the number of SMEs winning domestic or direct 
cross border public contracts. Between 2009 and 2011, SMEs won 56 per cent of domestic 
contracts and 54 per cent of cross border contracts.62  
 
However, the average contract value won by SMEs is considerably lower than those won by 
larger enterprises. The combined value of the contracts won by SMEs represent only a 29 per 
cent share of the above-threshold market in the EU, and only 22 per cent in the EFTA 
States.63 These aggregated contract values are disproportionate to SMEs overall significance 
in the economy: the 29 per cent share is considerable lower than SMEs share of gross value 
added produced in the business economy (58 per cent).64 
 
Why is it that SMEs are struggling to participate in public procurement? 
 
																																																								
59 Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 105  
60 COM(2011) 896 final, pp. 10-11 
61 SMEs access to public procurement, p. 5	
62 Above EU thresholds, see SMEs access to public procurement, p. 67 
63 SMEs access to public procurement, p. 29 
64 SMEs access to public procurement, p. 35 
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Evidence suggest that there are a number of factors influencing the lack of SME 
participation65, but the size of the contract66 is probably the most prominent of them all as also 
recognised by the Commission.67 In fact, the larger a contract, the less likely it will be 
awarded to SMEs. This effect is felt whenever contracts are larger than EUR 60 000.68 The 
same effect is not observed among lower-value contracts.69 The disadvantages that large 
contracts impose on SMEs are that the costs of tendering are too high or that the scale of the 
contract is beyond their capability.70 
 
As the value of public contracts has a major influence on the extent to which SMEs can 
access public contracts above EU thresholds, dividing contracts into lots is one of the most 
important tools to facilitate SME participation.71 Breaking contracts down into lots enables 
public contracts to be better suited to fit the capacity and the potential specialisation of 
SMEs.72 
 
3 Dividing contracts into lots to facilitate SMEs 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As a result of the realisation that large contracts is a major obstacle for SMEs, and among four 
new instruments to facilitate SMEs in public procurement73, Directive 2014/24 now contains 
a provision regulating division of contracts into lots.74 Dividing contracts into lots has 
																																																								
65 Other obstacles are ensuring access to relevant information, the quality and understanding of the 
information provided, the qualification levels and financial requirements, administrative burden, the 
emphasis on price, time limits to draw up tenders and ensuring payments on time, see Code of Best 
Practice, pp. 2-3 
66 Hatzis (2009), p. 365; Loader, “Are public sector procurement models and practises hindering small 
suppliers? Evidence from English local authorities”, Public Money & Management, 2011, 31:4, pp. 
287-294 on p. 292; SMEs access to public procurement, p. 49 
67 Code of Best Practice, p. 2  
68 SMEs access to public procurement, p. 6 
69 SMEs access to public procurement, p. 6	
70 Loader (2007), 27:5, p. 310 
71 SMEs access to public procurement, p. 53 
72 Shoenmaekers, “The role of SMEs in promoting sustainable procurement”, In Sustainable Public 
Procurement Under EU Law: New Perspectives on the State as Stakeholder, Beate Sjåfjell and Anja 
Wiesbrock (eds.), 2016, p. 169 
73 Other innovations are the European Single Document in Article 59, limitations of requirements for 
participation in Article 58 and direct payments to subcontractors in Articles 71.3 and 71.7  
74 Directive 2014/24 Article 46	
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received a lot of support as an SME friendly tool; however, the concept has simultaneously 
given raise to concerns due to potential risks imposed by dividing contracts into lots. This 
chapter investigates why lot division has been granted positive reviews as an SME friendly 
tool in section 3.2 before analysing the potential risks in section 3.3. 
 
3.2 Lot division as a SME vehicle 
Lot division implies that the contracting authority breaks a public contract into different lots 
in which economic operators may submit tenders for. The contracting authority then evaluates 
the submitted tenders for each lot, and award the winning tenderer of a lot with a contract 
corresponding to the content of the specific lot. For example, a contract for the purchase of 
computers is worth EUR 1 million. Instead of putting a single contract out to tender, the 
contact is divided into five lots each worth EUR 200 000. After the winning tenderer for each 
lot is chosen, the contracting authority signs contracts with five economic operators on the 
delivery of the amount of computers corresponding to each lot.   
 
Dividing contracts into lots causes the individual contract to correspond better with SMEs 
restricted financial, personnel and technical capacity. As stated by Morand,  
 
“[t]echnically, the very first way of enabling direct SME participation in public 
procurement is to divide proposed acquisitions of supplies and services into 
reasonably small lots to permit offers on quantities less than the total requirement. 
This allotment (or unbundling) favors wide small business participation”.75  
 
Also, it is not unusual that SMEs are more efficient to provide just a part of a bigger contract, 
since they are often tailored to offer specifically limited supplies, services or works.76 Thus, 




75 Morand, “SMEs and public procurement policy”, Review of Economic Design, 2003, 8:3, pp. 301-
318 on p. 302 
76 Grimm, Pacini, Spagnolo and Zanza, “Division into lots and competition in procurement”. In: 
Handbook of procurement, Nicola Dimitri, Gustavo Piga and Giancarlo Spagnolo (eds.), 2006, p. 180 
77 Shoenmaekers (2016), p. 169	
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In addition to create smaller contracts that correspond better with the capacities and 
specialisation of SMEs, lot division also generates more contracts, which contributes to 
increase SME participation. As argued by Herrera Anchustegui, lot division leads to more 
contracts being put out to tender while lowering their value, giving “[…] more chances [for 
SMEs] to win some lots and obtain a slice of the procurement pie”.78 In other words, dividing 
contracts into lots multiplies the amount of contracts SMEs are able to tender for.79 
 
As seen in this discussion, lot division is an adequate tool to help SMEs overcome the 
obstacles of large contracts and thus promote their participation in public procurement. 
However, there are a few risks linked to lot division, which are reviewed immediately below.  
 
3.3 Risks generated by dividing contracts into lots 
 
3.3.1 Interference with competition 
As stressed by Hatzis, lot division is only lawful under the public procurement regime if both 
SMEs and large enterprises are allowed to tender for the contract as a whole or parts of it, and 
if the award of the contract goes to the overall best offer, because otherwise, lot division 
would impose “[…] an artificial interference with competition which cannot be justified”.80 
However, as shall be seen in the analysis of Article 46.2, the provision allows for multiple 
bids and will thus not interfere with the competition    
 
3.3.2 Bid rigging 
Dividing contracts into lots facilitates SME participation, which in turn generates increased 
competition. However, lot division also have the potential of hindering competition.81  
 
Sànchez Graells stresses that lot division risks facilitating bid rigging, which is an 
infringement of the competition rules in TFEU Article 101 and EEA Agreement Article 53.82 
Directive 2014/24 states that the award of public contracts has to comply with the principles 
																																																								
78 Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), p. 2, his emphasis 
79 Shoenmaekers (2016), p. 169  
80 Hatzis (2009), p. 367; See similar views in Sánchez Graells (2015), pp. 350-351. 	
81 Grimm et al. (2006), p. 179 
82 Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 350 
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of the TFEU although contracting authorities are not undertakings and the competition rules 
do not apply to them.83 However, competition law applies to the tenderers.84 Thus, public 
procurement law and competition law regulate two different sides of the procurement and it is 
therefore natural that these regulations complement each other.85 
 
According to the OECD, bid rigging, also referred to as collusive tendering,  
 
“[…] occurs when businesses, that would otherwise be expected to compete, secretly 
conspire to raise prices or lower the quality of goods or services for purchasers who 
wish to acquire products or services through a bidding process”.86  
 
Bid rigging is harmful to public procurement as it drains recourses from public authorities and 
ultimately the taxpayers by undermining the benefits of competition and weakens the 
confidence in the competitive process.87  
 
Since bid-rigging agreements are conducted in secret, they are difficult to discover.88 
However, economic theory suggests preventing the risk of bid rigging by applying two 
criteria when contracts are divided into lots. Firstly, to prevent distribution of lots among 
tenderers, weaken the collusion and increase the chances of detection, the number of lots 
should be smaller than the expected number of tenderers.89 Secondly, the number of lots must 
exceed the number of contracts to reserve additional lots for new entrants.90 Consequently, lot 
division regulation should not require contracts to be divided into specific numbers of lots, 
but allow for flexibility.91 In line with these recommendations, Article 46.1 gives the 
																																																								
83 Directive 2014/24, recital 1; Case C-205/03 P FENIN v Commission [2006] ECR I-6295, para 26 
and Case C-113/07 P Selex Sistemi SpA v Commission [2009] ECR I-2207, para 102, referred to in 
Ølykke, “How does the Court of Justice of the European Union Pursue Competition Concerns in a 
Public Procurement Context?”, Public Procurement Law Review, 2011, 6, pp. 179-192, at pp. 180-
181. 
84 Ølykke (2011), p. 179 
85 As indicated by Directive 2014/24, recital 1 
86 OECD, Recommendation of the OECD Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement, 
2012, p. 5 
87 OECD, Recommendation of the OECD Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement, 
2012, p. 5 
88 OECD, Recommendation of the OECD Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement, 
2012, p. 15 
89 Grimm et al. (2006), pp. 168-169; Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 350 
90 Grimm et al. (2006), p. 169; Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 350 
91 Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 350 
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contracting authority discretion to decide the number of lots, which reduces the risk of 
facilitating bid rigging.92  
 
3.3.3 Lot division may not be feasible 
It is also submitted that lot division might not always be feasible, in that dividing the contract 
might render the procurement of supplies, services or works concerned technically or 
economically difficult to implement, or decrease the efficiency of the procurement process or 
raise the procurement costs disproportionally.93 Lot division regulation must therefore allow 
for flexibility so that public procurement is not impeded and to avoid ineffective and costly 
procurement procedures.94 However, this has also been taken into account in the design of 
Article 46.1, which allow for the award of a single contract in theses situations.95 
 
3.3.4 Increased costs and complication of the procurement procedure 
A more practical concern is that dividing contracts into lots complicates and increases the 
costs of the procurement process. Lot division might cause legal complications regarding the 
division of work and increase coordination costs.96 Dividing contracts into lots involves 
dealing with multiple parties and contracts, which is more costly, both financially and 
administratively than dealing with only one party and one contract.97 In addition, public 
authorities usually have limited budgets and administrative resources, which causes lot 
division to not always be desirable from the contracting authority’s point of view.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
As seen by the discussion above, the risks concerning interference with competition, bid 
rigging and that lot division might not be feasible for the procurement concerned, has been 
taken into account in the design of Article 46 as the analysis in section 4.2.2 shows. 
 
																																																								
92 See also Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 350 
93 Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 349 
94 Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 349 
95 Directive 2014/24, recital 78 
96 Hatzis (2009), p. 366 
97 Hatzis (2009), pp. 366-367; Pedro Telles points out that lot division also increases the transaction 
costs for economic operators since more resources are required to bid on multiple lots than to bid once 
on a large contract, see blogpost at http://www.telles.eu/blog/2015/4/30/public-contracts-regulations-
2105-regulation-46  
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Also, the concern of increased costs and complication of the procurement procedure will be 
remedied although this does not follow from the design of Article 46. Despite that lot division 
increases the administrative costs for contracting authorities, the benefits deriving from an 
increased SME participation in public procurement and increased competition for the specific 
public contract and for future public contracts, improves value for money, will outweigh this 
objection.98 More precisely, even though lot division is more costly than awarding a single 
contract in a short-term perspective, the increased supplier base will generate cost-savings in 
a long-term perspective.99 
 
Concluding, Article 46 is a SME-friendly tool since it does not require using additional 
secondary policy mechanisms to promote SME participation and neither has significant 
market distorting effects by decreasing competition.100 
 
4 The effects of Article 46 on SME participation 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As seen from the discussion above, lot division is an adequate tool to promote SMEs in public 
procurement and letting them overcome the obstacles of large contracts by generating 
contracts more compatible to their size. However, despite being relatively new, and only 
recently implemented by the Member States, Article 46 has already been the subject of 
criticism due to its soft approach101 which risks that the provision will not achieve its aim of 
promoting SMEs in public procurement, but merely remain a political flag devoid of 
content.102  
 
Thus, this section analyses the legal regime applicable to dividing contracts into lots in 
section 4.2 before evaluating the effects of the provision on SME participation, and in 
particular the justification required to award a single contract, in section 4.3.   
																																																								
98 Hatzis (2009), p. 367; Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 348 
99 Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), pp. 6 and 14 
100 Morand (2003), p. 302; Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), p. 2 
101 Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 347; Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), p. 7 
102 Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), pp. 7 and 15	
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4.2 Presentation of Article 46 
 
4.2.1 The legislative process 
The previous public procurement directives103 did not contain any provisions on dividing 
contracts into lots. Although they allowed for contracts to be divided into separate lots, their 
intentions was not to regulate lot division, but rather to ensure that lot division did not 
circumvent the thresholds and avoid the directives from applying to the tender process.104 The 
only other reference to lot division was made in Directive 2004/18/EC Annex VII A, which 
stated that if contracts were divided, an indication of the possibility of tendering for one, 
several or all the lots needed to be included in the contract notice.105 Article 46 is thus an 
innovation that came along with the adoption of Directive 2014/24.  
 
The wording of the disposition dealing with lot division was disputed during the legislative 
process, and in particular the phrasing of the requirement to provide a justification when 
contracting authorities decides not to divide the contract. This section takes a brief look at the 
historical development of the provision.106  
 
The idea behind the Commission’s proposal107 was to invite contracting authorities to divide 
contracts into lots to make public contracts more accessible for SMEs by demanding a 
specific explanation when lot division was not chosen.108 
 
According to the original proposal Article 44.1 – contracting authorities “[…] shall provide in 
the contract notice or in the invitation to confirm interest a specific explanation of its 
reasons”.109 The associated recital 30 further elaborated that contracting authorities “[…] 
should be encouraged to divide contracts into lots, and be obliged to state the reasons for not 
																																																								
103 Directive 2004/18/EC and Directive 2004/27/EC 
104 Directive 2004/18/EC, Article 9.5 and recital 9; Directive 2004/17/EC, Article 17.6 and recital 17; 
Trybus (2014), p. 262 
105 Sánchez Graells (2015), p, 347 
106 For a more detailed discussion, see Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press) pp. 2-6 
107 COM(2011) 896 final 
108 COM(2011) 896 final, p. 11 
109 COM(2011) 896 final, p. 76, my emphasis	
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doing so”.110 In summary, the Commission’s proposal put forward a “divide or explain” 
approach.111 
 
The Parliament supported the need to promote SMEs access to public procurement; however, 
their view was that “[…] a near total obligation for contracting authorities to divide contracts 
into lots is the wrong approach”.112 In keeping with this notion, the Parliament suggested 
supressing the “divide or explain” approach in Article 44.1.113 
 
However, an interim solution was ultimately reached. The final wording of Article 46.1 is 
therefore a compromise between a strict explanation duty and a proposal to supress this duty 
as a whole. The following sections analyses the final wording of Article 46, with an emphasis 
on the reception of the “divide or explain” justification and its effects on SME participation.  
 
4.2.2 The final outcome of Article 46 
First and foremost, Article 46.4 allows Member States to decide when and under which 
circumstances public procurement contracts shall be divided pursuant to national legislation.  
 
When lot division is not made mandatory, Article 46.1 states that contracting authorities “[…] 
may decide to award a contract the form of separate lots and may determine the size and 
subject matter of such lots”. Lot division could be done on quantitative basis, in that the 
individual contract size correspond with the capacity of SMEs, or on qualitative basis, in 
accordance with the different trades and specialisations involved to adapt the content of the 
individual contracts more closely to the specialised sectors of SMEs or in accordance with 
different subsequent project phases.114  
 
If the contract is not divided, contracting authorities must provide an “[…] indication of the 
main reason for their decision […]”.115 Any administrative or judicial supervision of the 
																																																								
110 COM(2011) 896 final, p. 21 
111 Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), p. 3 
112 Parliament, Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on public procurement, A7-0034/2013, 2013, p. 29 
113 Parliament, Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on public procurement, A7-0034/2013, 2013, p. 95 Amendment 163 and p. 300 Amendment 68 
114 Directive 2014/24, recital 78	
115 Directive 2014/24, Article 46.1 
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reasons is banned, meaning that contracting authorities retain autonomy to apply any reasons 
they deem relevant.116 
 
According to Article 46.2, contracting authorities must specify in the contract notice or the 
invitation, whether it is allowed to tender for one, several or all lots. Contracting authorities 
may however, limit the number of lots that may be awarded to the same tenderer.  
 
Member States may also provide that, where more than one lot may be awarded to the same 
tenderer, contracting authorities may award contracts combining several or all lots where this 
provided for in the contract notice or invitation, in addition to which lots or groups of lots that 
may be combined.117 
 
As seen by this analysis, Article 46 has taken into account the risks generated by dividing 
contracts into lots.118 The provision facilitates competition between larger companies and 
SMEs by not favouring SMEs and allowing bundling of lots, as well as providing flexibility 
in that lot division is not obligatory when it renders the execution of the procurement difficult. 
Also, Article 46 increases the likelihood of preventing and detecting bid rigging by allowing 
the contracting authority to decide the number of lots to be created.119  
 
4.3 Does Article 46 achieve its goal of promoting SMEs? 
 
4.3.1 General remarks 
As a whole, Article 46 is welcome because it regulates of lot division, which promotes SME 
participation. Further, Article 46 ensures that lot division is part of the framework for the 
procurement regulation in all Member States, and thus creates a greater degree of 
homogeneity regarding facilitating SMEs throughout Europe. However, there are a few issues 
regarding the design of Article 46, which give rise to doubt of whether the provision will be 
an effective remedy to promote SME participation in public procurement. 
 
																																																								
116 Directive 2014/24, recital 78; See different view in Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 347 
117 See Article 46.3 
118 See discussion in section 3.3 
119 Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 350	
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Firstly, I submit that SME participation would be facilitated further if Directive 2014/24 
provided certain circumstances in which lot division was obligatory. The current national 
discretion has lead to, as shall be seen in the comparative analysis of the implementation 
below, that none of the selected Member States chose to make lot division mandatory 
pursuant to Article 46.4. As indicated by Article 46.4, there are circumstances in which it is 
possible to require mandatory lot division, and these would be circumstances, that would not 
depend upon the conditions in the various Member States. However, although it is possible to 
identify common terms at EU level, it is appropriate to leave this discretion to Member States, 
as mandatory lot division is a matter of national policy as well. In addition, this discretion up 
to Member States does not contradict the purpose of Article 46, which is to increase SME 
participation.  
 
Secondly, I submit alongside with the concerns raised in legal theory120 that the soft 
justification required when awarding a single contract according to Article 46.1 fails to 
provide sufficient incentives to divide contracts. This statement is elaborated in section 4.3.2. 
 
Thirdly, I submit that the possibility to bundle lots pursuant to Article 46.3 counteract the 
effort to divide the contract in the first place.121 When lots are reassembled back into larger 
contracts, SMEs will once again experience the difficulties of large contracts. However, as 
submitted by Sánchez Graells, it is important to allow flexible rules “[…] that allow for a 
trade-off between fostering competition between smaller bidders and allowing larger bidders 
to exploit economies of scale, as well as for independent decisions to be made by tenderers – 
since multiple or package bidding will encourage bidders to submit more competitive 
packages than they would for independent lots or all the lots”.122. Although bundling of lots 
puts SMEs at disadvantage, it is necessary to avoid artificial disruption of competition and to 
comply with the public procurement principle of non-discrimination.123  
 
4.3.2 The obligation to provide a justification 
 
																																																								
120 Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), p. 7 
121 Trybus (2014), p. 353; Sánchez Graells, 2015, p. 352 
122 Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 350 
123 Hatzis (2009), p. 367	
	 25	
4.3.2.1 The requirement of ‘indication of the main reasons’ 
In view of the remarks above, an increased SME participation will depend on whether the 
justification requirement is likely to provide strong enough motivation to divide public 
contracts. However, the final outcome of the justification requirement in Article 46.1 has been 
described in legal literature as soft-approach124, which might not be able to facilitate lot 
division and SME participation. Thus, this section outlines the objections in legal literature 
and evaluate whether the justification required will incentivise contracting authorities to 
divide contracts. 
 
Although lot division is desirable to facilitate SME participation, it is recalled that dividing 
contracts into lots generates increased use of resources for contracting authorities, and due to 
their usually limited budgets and administrative resources, lot division may not be desirable 
from the contracting authority’s perspective.125 However, despite being more costly in a short-
term perspective, lot division increases the supplier base, which will generate cost-savings in 
a long-term perspective.126 Contracting authorities must therefore be given incentives to be 
encouraged to divide contracts into lots. The function of the justification requirement in 
Article 46.1 is to provide such incentives.  
 
The rationale for requiring a justification when deciding to award a single contract is for 
contracting authorities to be “[…] encouraged to divide large contracts into lots” and to 
establish “[…] a duty to consider the appropriateness of dividing contracts into lots […]”.127 
Trybus elaborates further by stating that “[t]he obligation to provide reasons for awarding a 
single contract forces officers to pause to consider the possibility to divide the contract into 
lots”.128 Moreover, I submit that when contracting authorities fail to provide relevant and 
sufficient reasons as to why they do not consider lot division appropriate, they will have no 
choice but to divide the contract.  
 
First of all, it is clear when reading Article 46.1 that lot division is the general rule, and that 
the award of a single contract is the exception. By identifying lot division as the main rule, 
																																																								
124 Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 347; Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), p.7  
125 See discussion in section 3.3.4 
126 Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), p. 7  
127 Directive 2014/24, recital 78  
128 Trybus (2014), pp. 265-266	
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incentives to divide the contract are generated because it creates a general expectation that 
contracts will be divided and derogations must be justified. 
 
As mentioned, the wording in Article 46.1 was chosen as a compromise and differs from the 
original and more prescriptive proposal in Article 44.1, which required contracting authorities 
to give a ‘specific explanation of its reasons’.129 It may nevertheless be argued that regardless 
of the formulation, the reasons for not dividing the contract must appear in the contract 
documents, resulting in that contracting authorities are forced to consider whether the contract 
should be divided. From this point of view, the choice of wording will not impact contracting 
authorities incentives to divide the contract.  
 
However, the change implies that the two wordings impose different requirement to the 
justification and what varies is the level of thoroughness of the assessment. In line with this 
notion, the final outcome of Article 46.1 is described in legal literature as a softer “divide or 
explain” approach130, since the wording does not require a thorough justification from 
contracting authorities.  
 
Herrera Anchustegui argues that the final outcome of the provision in Article 46.1 is “[…] 
rather timid and ambiguous […]” as the wording of ‘providing an indication’ imposes a lower 
threshold of motivation of the decision […]”.131 Further, he argues that Article 46 “[…] may 
risk becoming a political flag devoid of content”.132 In my opinion, the criticism is legitimate, 
as ‘indication’ does not imply the same level of completeness as ‘specific explanation’; the 
more thorough and detailed explanation required the more contracting authorities are forced 
to conduct a proper assessment on whether the contract should be divided. A requirement to 
provide an ‘indication’ gives little motivation to make a carefully considered assessment, 
since it does not require a full review of the assessment to appear in contract notice. In 
addition, the clarification that only the ‘main reasons’ is needed lowers the motivation to 
undertake a thorough assessment further, compared to the Commission's proposal, which did 
not limit the justification requirement to include only the main reasons.  
 
																																																								
129 See the discussion in section 4.2.1 
130 Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 347; Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), pp. 2 and 7  
131 Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), p. 7 
132 Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), p. 7	
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Furthermore, recital 78 points out that when considering lot division, contracting authorities 
are “[…] free to decide autonomously on the basis of any reason it deem relevant […]”.133  
Thus, contracting authorities have considerable freedom with regards to which reasons they 
consider to be sufficient, and thus retain authority for when lot division is appropriate. This 
public buyer is closest to evaluate the appropriateness of lot division, especially since lot 
division might not be feasible for the specific work, service or supply they want to procure.134 
A certain degree of flexibility is therefore sensible.135 However, when the demands on the 
justification are low and no administrative and judicial review of the reasons provided shall 
take place, this freedom of choice might risk rendering Article 46.1 devoid of content, as 
worded by Herrera Anchustegui.  
 
Fortunatley, the Directive provides examples that guide the application of Article 46.1 by 
listing some reasons in which it is justified not to divide the contract into lots. These would be 
instances in which lot division risks 
 
“[…] restricting competition, or risk rendering the execution of the contract 
excessively technically difficult or expensive, or that the need to coordinate the 
different contractors for the lots could seriously risk undermining the proper execution 
of the contract”.136  
 
Although these examples are not exhaustive, they provide, in my opinion, a threshold for 
acceptable reasons not to divide contracts into lots. By showing situations where lot division 
may not be appropriate, the seemingly limitless freedom of contracting authorities is 
counteracted to a certain extent because the reasons they use must comply with this threshold.  
 
In addition to specifying a certain threshold, I submit, based on the contribution of Sánchez 
Graells, that these examples also guides how the assessment should be carried out, by 
indirectly providing the legal standard; lot division is the main rule, unless it proves to be 
inadequate or disproportionate due to the work, supplies and services concerned.137 Although 
contracting authorities are free to base their decision on the reasons they deem relevant, these 
																																																								
133 Directive 2014/24, recital 78  
134 Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 349.  
135 Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 349.  
136 Directive 2014/24, recital 78  
137 Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 349.  
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reasons must be sufficient to prove that lot division is inadequate or disproportionate for the 
contract concerned in. Thus, the main reasons of why lot division is inadequate or 
disproportionate must appear in the contract documents, and this will create confidence in that 
the contracting authorities based their decision on acceptable reasons. 
 
However, the justification requirement in Article 46.1 is still problematic as a mere 
‘indication of the main reasons’ makes it difficult to assess whether the contracting authority 
has seriously considered lot division. This concern might risk that contracting authorities 
circumvent the duty to consider lot division. Both Herrera Anchustegui and Trybus argue that 
the soft requirement might tempt to use the “cut and paste” method.138 This method implies 
that the contracting authority only lists standard reasons to award a single contract without 
seriously considering lot division.139  
 
In my opinion, this risk of “cut and paste” answers gives cause for serious concern that 
Article 46.1 is not capable of facilitating lot division as intended. Since no thorough 
justification needs to appear in the contract documents it is easy for contracting authorities to 
circumvent the process of weighing the arguments for and against dividing the contract, and 
this risk of circumventing the assessment render the whole point of providing an ‘indication’ 
meaningless. Since a proper assessment is crucial to create adequate incentives to divide the 
contract, the objection in legal theory is legitimate.  
 
Concluding, this analysis shows that the design of Article 46.1 has some important 
deficiencies, in particular the risk of the ‘copy paste’ method, which might negatively impact 
the ability of the provision to create incentives for contracting authorities to divide contracts 
into lots and impact SME successful participation in EU public procurement. The next 
sections therefore consider whether the issues of the soft wording can be remedied through 
the principle of good administration in section 4.3.2.2, the fundamental market freedoms in 
section in 4.3.2.3 and finally the competition principle in section 4.3.2.4 before concluding on 
the effects of these remedies in section 4.3.2.5.  
 
																																																								
138 Trybus (2014), p. 266; Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), p. 7 
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4.3.2.2 The principle of good administration 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union140 Article 41 sets out the principle of 
good administration and states that the right to good administration includes “the obligation 
of the administration to give reasons for its decisions”.141 ECJ has expressly stated, however, 
that the Charter is not addressed to Member States, but solely the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the EU.142 This means that contracting authorities are not bound by the 
principle of good administration. 
 
However, the right of good administration might constitute an integral part of the right to 
defence, which is a principle of EU law.143 Herrera Anchustegui argues in line with Advocate 
General Wahl144 that the issue would in that case be to decide whether  
 
“[…] providing a mere indication of the reasons not to divide is sufficient to fulfil the 
thresholds required by the rights of good administration and defence under EU law or, 
it if on the contrary, contracting authorities are obliged to give a clear explanation why 
the contract was not divided, the standard required from the Commission when 
deciding competition law cases, for example”.145 
 
In this context it is recalled that even though Directive 2014/24 precludes the possibility for 
legal and administrative supervision, this only applies to the reasons the contracting authority 
deems relevant, and not whether the contracting authority has provided a sufficient 
justification.146   
 
Further, Herrera Anchustegui argues that  
																																																								
140 Henceforth the Charter; The Charter has the same legal status as TEU and TFEU meaning that the 
Charter serves aid to the interpretation of EU Directives, see TEU art. 6.1, see Lenaerts, “Exploring 
the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”, European Constitutional Law Review, 2012, 
8:3, pp. 375-403 on pp. 375-376 
141 The Charter, Article 41.2 (c) 
142 See inter alia C-482/10, Teresa Cicala v Regione Siciliana [2011] ECR I-14139 para 28; Joined 
cases C-141/12 and C-372/12, Ys and others [2014] EU:C:2014:2081 para 67; C-166/13, Mukarubega 
[2014] EU:C:2014:2336 para 44; Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), p. 7 
143 C-166/13, Mukarubega para 45 which referred to Article 41.2 (a), see Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – 
in press), p. 7 
144 C-268/14 P, Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Italmobiliare SpA v European Commission, 
EU:C:2015:697, para 51 
145 Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), p. 7, his emphasis 
146 Directive 2014/24, recital 78; See different view in Sánchez Graells (2015), p. 347 
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“[a] mere indication of the reasons not to divide the contract would probably be 
considered by the CJEU as limiting excessively the right of good administration and 
defence as the claimant would lack sufficient information as to the reasons 
determining why the contract was not divided”.147  
 
In my opinion, this argument is legitimate as lack of information restricts the right to defence 
in two respects. 
 
Firstly, for the right to defence to be effective, the complainant must have sufficient 
information to evaluate whether or not to take legal action. Lack of information makes it 
difficult for the complainant to assess whether the award of a single contract was in 
accordance with Article 46.1.  
 
Secondly, the burden of proof that follows national procedural law usually lies on the 
complainant.148 When most of the information regarding the decision not dividing the contract 
is kept in the hands of the contracting authority, or solely in their knowledge, it is difficult for 
the complainant to attain the proof requirements. When the complainant knows that he cannot 
prove his case, he will refrain from making a complaint at all.  
 
Thus, lack of information leads to a high threshold for complaints, which would restrict the 
right to defence and ultimately result in that the justification is solely in the contracting 
authorities’ discretion. For the right of defence to be effective, the ECJ could argue that the 
‘indication’ must be sufficiently substantive so that economic operators have the possibility to 
review whether the award of a single contract was in accordance with Article 46.1.  
 
4.3.2.3 The fundamental market freedoms 
The award of public contracts needs to comply with the free movement of goods and freedom 
to provide services, which comprises free movement of goods, freedom of establishment and 
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freedom to provide services.149 In this relation, Herrera Anchustegui argues that if the mere 
‘indication’ constitutes a breach on the right to defence, the ECJ could  
 
“[…] argue that the lack of substantive indications may implicitly reduce the 
incentives of economic operators to tender and, therefore may impact their exercise of 
the fundamental market freedoms”.150   
 
As a mere ‘indication of the main reasons’ does not provide sufficient incentives for 
contracting authorities to divide contracts into lots, there will not be many contracts that 
SMEs will be able to tender for, which in turn reduces their incentives to tender. Following 
this argumentation, the ECJ could require that contracting authorities provide a substantive 
explanation of the reasons as to why the contract was not divided into lots”.151  
 
4.3.2.4 The principle of competition 
Competition is considered as one of the most overreaching and desirable goals in public 
procurement as competition helps ensure value for money.152 The importance of the 
competition principle resulted in Article 18.1, which codifies that the principle of competition 
should be a normative and legal guideline for the interpretation of the rules on procurement in 
the directive.153 Thus, Article 18.1 is relevant for the interpretation of the justification 
requirement in Article 46.1. Also, any anti-competitive procurement practises constitute a 
breach of Directive 2014/24.154 
 
Article 18.1 proclaims that, "[t]he design of the procurement procedure shall not be made 
with the intention […] of artificially narrowing competition”. Further, it explains that 
competition shall be considered artificially narrowed where “the design of the procurement is 
																																																								
149 Directive 2014/24, recital 1 
150 Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), p. 7-8 for further references. 
151 Herrera Anchustegui (2016 – in press), p. 7-8 for further references. 
152 Sánchez Graells (2015), pp. 102 and 105;  
153 Sánchez Graells, “A Deformed Principle of Competition? – The Subjective Drafting of Article 
18(1) of Directive 2014/24”. In: Grith Skovgaard Ølykke & Albert Sánchez-Graells (eds.), 
Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules in 2014, 2016 – in press, p. 7.  
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made with the intention of unduly favouring or disadvantaging certain economic 
operators”.155  
 
When lot division is not chosen, SMEs are put to a disadvantage while the competition 
decreases, since there are fewer potential economic operators able to tender for the contract. 
However, this does not in itself constitute a breach of Article 18.1 as provision requires that 
the disadvantage of certain economic operators must be unduly.  
 
This means that when lot division, in line with the legal standard established in section 
4.3.2.1, proves to be inadequate or disproportionate to the nature of the contract, the award of 
a single contract does not unduly favour larger companies or disadvantage SMEs, since there 
are legitimate reasons as to why the contract was not divided.  
 
On the contrary, if a contracting authority merely copy-paste standard reasons to avoid lot 
division, I submit that this might constitute a violation of Article 18.1; when lot division is 
refused in this hypothetical scenario, the design of the contract unduly disadvantages and 
favours certain economic operators.  
 
Following this argumentation, the ECJ could argue that contracting authorities must provide a 
substantial justification in order to comply with the competition principle. 
 
4.3.2.5 Conclusion on the effects of the remedies  
The implications of the right to good administration and defence, the fundamental market 
freedoms and the competition principle do not directly remedy the soft wording of Article 
46.1. However, they are additional mechanisms, which could motivate contracting authorities 
to undertake a proper assessment on whether lot division is appropriate and to provide a 
substantial ‘indication’ to avoid the risk of being challenged by the ECJ.  
 
Nevertheless, relying on these remedies to motivate contracting authorities to provide a 
substantial justification is not a practical solution. As the aim of Article 46.1 is to provide 
incentives to divide the contract, the motivation should derive from the provision itself.  
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4.4 Reflections 
Although the lot division-rule has received a lot of support as a SME-friendly tool and is seen 
as the most adequate tool to promote SME participation, the design of Article 46 has some 
important deficiencies, which will risk the provision becoming devoid of content.  
 
Since Directive 2014/24 does not identify circumstances in which lot division shall be 
mandatory, SME participation depends on the incentives to divide contracts arising from the 
justification requirement, unless Member States choose to implement mandatory lot division 
in their national legislation. Although SME participation is also affected negatively by the 
possibility to bundle lots, this is a necessary method to comply with the principle of non-
discrimination.  
 
I submit that the justification requirement is too weak to create sufficient incentives to divide 
the contract, especially considering the additional financial and administrative costs imposed 
on the contracting authority caused by lot division.  
 
Although Directive 2014/24 provides the legal standard for the assessment on whether the 
contract should be divided, this provides little help, as the assessment does not have to appear 
in the procurement documents. Thus, requiring a mere ‘indication of the main reasons’ gives 
little motivation to divide contracts and risks the use of “copy-paste”-method.  
 
The implications of the right to good administration and defence, the fundamental market 
rights and the competition principle provides the opportunity for judicial review of ‘indication 
of the main reasons’, which might help create incentives to undertake a proper assessment and 
provide a substantial justification when awarding a single contract. This presupposes that ECJ 
will follow similar argumentations in the future to come. However, to rely on judicial review 
to create a more substantial requirement than a mere ‘indication of the main reasons’ is an 
impractical solution, since the incentives to divide contracts should derive from Article 46.1 
as the aim of the provision is to encourage contracting authorities to divide contracts into lots 
to facilitate SME participation.156 
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5 The Norwegian proposal on lot division 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The national policy on lot division varied between Member States before the adoption of 
Directive 2014/24.157 The inclusion of Article 46 ensures that lot division is part of the 
framework for the procurement regulation in all Member States, and thus creates a greater 
degree of homogeneity in EU. Although EU/EEA Directives are legally binging, Member 
States are free to choose the form and method as long as the results set out in the Directives is 
achieved.158 
 
Directive 2014/24 specifies that Member States are free to go further in their efforts to ease of 
access for SME participation by lot division; either by extending the requirement to give 
reasons or by making lot division mandatory under certain conditions.159 Thus, the effect of 
lot division as a SME-vehicle in practice depends largely on the national regulation.  
 
The implementation of Article 46 may vary between Member States. The aim of this part is to 
evaluate the Norwegian proposal, and in particular the justification requirement, before 
comparing it to the implementation in Denmark, United Kingdom and France. 
 
5.2 Current public procurement legislation 
Both the current Public Procurement Act160 and Regulation161 on public procurement contain 
provisions, like the previous public procurement directives, allowed contracts to be divided 
into lots. The only references to lot division state that contracting authorities are not allowed 
to divide a contract to avoid the Public Procurement Act and Regulation from applying.162 
Otherwise, as in the case of the former public procurement directives, division of contracts is 
not regulated.  
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A proposal on new law on public procurement is currently being considered in the 
Parliament.163 After Parliamentary Decision is made this proposal repeal the current Public 
Procurement Act although some changes may be made during the Parliamentary hearing. 
Division of contracts into lots will be regulated in the forthcoming Regulation and the current 
proposal suggests implementing the lot division rule in § 14-1.164  
 
5.3 Presentation and general remarks on the lot division proposal  
The Norwegian proposal for new regulation on public procurement does not make lot division 
mandatory as allowed for by Article 46.4. This decision is justified in the preparatory works 
by the potential negative consequences of lot division concerning the legal responsibility and 
risk distribution when the responsibility is placed on multiple economic operators.165 In my 
opinion, specifying in the contract that the party to it is responsible might solve this objection. 
Although the placement of responsibility might be difficult to establish or predict for some 
procurements since the different contributions are interrelated, mandatory lot division does 
not have to encompass such contracts, but rather where it is easier to distinguish between the 
various contributions.  
 
Furthermore, another objection against mandatory lot division in the preparatory work is that 
lot division requires more personnel and resources for technical and financial coordination 
and monitoring when implementing the contract, and that lot division would make it more 
difficult to apply to the functional requirements.166 In my opinion, difficulties with functional 
requirements do not necessarily apply to all purchases. For example, the purchase of paper 
could be made through several economic operators without interfering with functional 
requirements of the purchase. Regarding the increased use of administrative and financial 
resources when buying through lots, the benefit of long-term value for money outweighs the 
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short-term savings by awarding a single contract.167 However, although SMEs would be 
facilitated further, mandatory lot division is a matter of national policy and discretion.168 As 
previously mentioned in section 4.3.1, the decision not to implement mandatory lot division 
does not contradict the purpose of increase SME participation. 
 
According to the proposal, contracting authorities must therefore undertake an assessment of 
whether lot division is appropriate for the specific contract pursuant to Article 46.1 of 
Directive 2014/24. The proposed Public Procurement Regulation § 14-1 (2) demands a “kort 
begrunnelse” – a short explanation, from contracting authorities when they decide not to 
divide the contract.169 Judicial review of the grounds, either KOFA or the courts, is not 
possible.170 An analysis of the justification requirement takes place in section 5.4.  
 
Norway also suggests implementing the option of combing several or all lots pursuant to 
Article 46.3 in the proposed § 14-1 (5).171 As argued in section 4.3.1, this reassembling of 
contracts might counteract the efforts to divide contracts in the first place. However, it is 
necessary to avoid artificial disruption of competition and to comply with the public 
procurement principle of non-discrimination.172 
 
Overall, the proposed lot division implementation into the Norwegian legislation seems in my 
opinion to be supportive of short time savings for the contracting authorities and efficiency 
rather than to support SME participation. This approach is disappointing, considering the 
important part SMEs play in Norwegian economy.173 
 
5.4 The requirement of ‘kort begrunnelse’ 
The preparatory work does not reveal whether the choice of wording was disputed or whether 
“kort begrunnelse” demands less than an ‘indication of the main reasons’. The lack of 
explanation suggests that the lawmakers consider § 14-1 (2) to be in accordance with 
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‘indication’ in Article 46.1. The aim of this discussion is to evaluate the incentives to divide 
contracts into lots created by the Norwegian justification requirement of ‘kort begrunnelse’.  
 
The wording of ‘begrunnelse’ – ‘explanation’ suggest that it is not enough to simply point at 
the reasons why the contract was not divided, and thus creates a greater insight into the 
contracting authority’s assessment compared to a mere ‘indication’. However in my opinion, 
since the literal wording explicitly requires the explanation to be “short”, it may be argued 
that the Norwegian regulation sets a lower minimum requirement than provided by Article 
46.1, and thus create lower incentives to divide the contract. In addition to this low demand 
on completeness, by not specifying that the main reasons must be included, the Norwegian 
implementation may lead to even less substantial justifications than that of Article 46.1. If this 
interpretation is assumed, the proposed § 14-1 (2) violates Norway’s obligation to implement 
Directive 2014/24 Article 46.1 pursuant to EEA Agreement Articles 3 and 7.  
 
At the same time, the consultation document makes it clear that contracting authorities are 
obliged to consider lot division, and that contracting authorities must provide an explanation 
when they choose not to divide the contract.174 The latter implies a stricter justification 
requirement than ‘kort begrunnelse’. However, EU directives must be implemented in a 
manner so it appears clear to the citizens what rights and obligations are entailed to anticipate 
their legal position.175 This means that it is not permissible to let the detailed content of a 
provision to be stated in preparatory work, which is common in Norwegian law.176 Thus, 
since a stricter justification requirement never made it to the proposed § 14-1 (2), the wording 
leaves no doubt that contracting authorities are only obliged to provide a ‘kort begrunnelse’.   
 
However, where the implementation fails to achieve the aim of a provision deriving from an 
EEA Directive, the Norwegian principle of presumption applies to ensure the effect of the 
EEA rule through an EEA-friendly interpretation of the Norwegian provision.177 The core of 
this principle is that the Norwegian courts, so far, advice, interpret national law in line with 
Norway's international obligations. According to the Supreme Court decision in Finanger I 
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does not apply when the EEA rule and Norwegian law is in clear conflict.178 If that is the 
case, the result is that the Norwegian rule is given precedence over the directly conflicting 
EEA law provision.179 Although § 14-1 (2) provides a lower minimum requirement than 
Article 46.1, it does not appear that an EEA-friendly interpretation pursuant to the principle of 
presumption will lead to a result that clearly contradicts the wording in § 14-1. 
 
If this is the case, the presumption principle implies that § 14-1 (2) shall be given a content 
which is in accordance with Article 46.1 meaning that the requirement of ‘kort begrunnelse’ 
shall be understood as setting the same minimum requirement as providing an ‘indication of 
the main reasons’. Given that they set the same requirement to justification, the same 
objections against merely providing an ‘indication of the main reasons’ in Article 46.1 can 
therefore be invoked against providing a ‘kort begrunnelse’ in § 14-1 (2). 
 
5.5 Brief comparison to other Member States 
Similar to the previous EU-directives, the repealed Danish procurement law did not regulate 
lot division.180 The Danish implementation does not make lot division mandatory, however, 
bundling of lots pursuant to Article 46.3 is implemented.181 When deciding not to divide the 
contract, contracting authorities are required to ‘oplyse om baggrunden herfor’ – which 
translates to a requirement of ‘disclose the reasons’.182  
 
The UK government has not followed the option in Article 46.4 to render it obligatory to 
award specific contracts in the form of separate lots. The implementation allows for bundling 
of several or all lots.183 Contracting authorities are required to provide an ‘indication of the 
main reasons’ for their decision not to subdivide into lots184, which is a ‘copy-paste’ of the 
justification requirement in Article 46.1.   
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France already included a general obligation to divide into lots unless this would lead to 
restriction on competition or make the contract difficult, expensive or impossible, which is a 
formula resembling Article 46.185 According to the new legislation, contracting authorities 
shall, in principle, award a contract in the form of separate lots. Contracting authorities must 
provide the ‘motive son choix’ – the motivation for their choice not to subdivide the contract 
into lots.186 Also, bundling of lots is allowed.187  
 
As seen by this discussion, the implementation in Denmark and France provides a stricter 
justification requirement than the implementation in United Kingdom and the Norwegian 
proposal.  
 
The implementation of Article 46 in the Member States and the Norwegian proposal on lot 
division can be summarised in a table as shown below. 
 
Member State Mandatory lot division   Bundling of lots Justification requirement 
Norway No Yes ‘kort begrunnelse’ 
Denmark No Yes ‘oplyse om baggrunden herfor’ 
United Kingdom No Yes ‘indication of the main reasons’ 
France No  Yes ‘motive son choix’ 
 
5.6 Reflections 
Considering that SMEs play an even more significant role in the Norwegian economy 
compared to the EU average in terms of value added, it could have been expected that the 
Norwegian proposal on lot division went further in facilitating SMEs, either by making lot 
division mandatory under certain circumstances or by setting a stricter minimum requirement 











However, the Norwegian proposal neither made lot division mandatory nor required a stricter 
justification requirement, which does not promote lot division further than the absolute 
minimum requirements in Article 46.  
 
If the proposed § 14-1 (2) is implemented in the Public Procurement Regulation as it is at 
today, the justification requirement would not create strong incentives to divide contracts into 
lots. However, it is possible that Norwegian Administrative law will provide additional 
motivation for contracting authorities to undertake a proper assessment and provide more 
substantial justifications than required from the wording of § 14-1 (2) when they decide not to 
divide the contract. Whether this is the case will be shown in the future to come, either by the 
contracting authorities use of ‘kort begrunnelse’ in practice of by a decision in KOFA if the 
wording is challenged. 
6 Concluding remarks 
 
As established in this thesis, promoting SME participation benefits the European economy 
and public procurement due to their contributions to the gross domestic product and economic 
stability during economic crisis, by increasing competition for public contracts, their 
importance to the European labour market and innovative tendencies. Although increased 
SME participation may require using more resources due to the need of evaluating tenders, 
the focus of Directive 2014/24 focus is to achieve savings in a long-term perspective. The key 
is to strike a balanced SME participation.  
 
The most adequate tool to let SMEs overcome the barrier of large contracts in public 
procurement is to divide contracts into lots, however, lot division may also generate some 
unwanted effects. Fortunately, the design of Article 46 has taken into account the potential 
risks of lot division that have been raised in both legal and economic theory. It paves the way 
for competition between large and small companies without favouring SMEs, provides 
flexibility making it possible to detect and prevent bid-rigging and takes into account that lot 




Directive 2014/24 expects that the new regulation on lot division will contribute to improve 
the level of success among SMEs.189 Although we cannot be certain of the ultimate effect, it is 
appropriate to make a few final remarks on Article 46 as an SME vehicle.  
 
The provision seeks to provide incentives for contracting authorities to divide contracts by 
establishing lot division the general rule, making it mandatory to provide an 'indication of the 
main reasons’ when lot division is not chosen. The soft wording might however, risk that 
contracting authorities will not be incentivised to divide contracts into lots. The preamble 
alleviates the soft requirement to some extent by providing the threshold for acceptable 
reasons and the legal standard. These measures may help to raise the motivation to divide 
contracts and may limit contracting authorities’ freedom. However, the thresholds and the 
legal standard do not reduce the risk of the “cut and paste” method.  
 
The potential remedies deriving from the right to good administration and defence, the 
fundamental market freedoms and the competition principle may contribute to motivate 
contracting authorities to provide a substantial ‘indication’ to avoid the risk of being 
challenged by the ECJ. However, it is not certain that ECJ would follow the same 
argumentation lines in the future to come. Also, the incentives to divide contract should come 
from the Article 46 itself, as the main aim of the provision is to encourage lot division.   
 
The impact of the new regime on division of contracts into lots does not solely depend on the 
transposition of Article 46 in the Member States, but also depends on how the potentially 
differing national regimes will be used by contracting authorities in practice.190 Although 
some Member States choses to require a stricter justification requirement, the low 
requirement of ‘indication of the main reasons’ in Article 46.1 paves the way for low 
justification requirements in Member States, as seen by the Norwegian and British 
implementation in section 5.5. 
 
Another aspect that is not discussed in this thesis that might contradict the efforts of Article 
46 is the demand aggregation techniques provided for in Directive 2014/24. Both economic 
and legal literature argues that these techniques negatively impact lot division and SME 
participation. According to Flynn & Davis, promoting demand aggregation and SMEs at the 
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same time, is an uneasy mix of policies and competing agendas, which in practice tend to 
counteract each other.191 Considering the facilitation of demand aggregation in Directive 
2014/24, SMEs should be facilitated further through lot division by requiring a stricter 
justification requirement.  
 
De lege ferenda, I submit that the design of Article 46 should have kept the initial proposal of 
requiring a specific explanation of its reason when deciding not to divide the contract in order 
to facilitate lot division and contribute to the success of SMEs in public procurement.  
 
At least the number of single contracts and the communicated reasons for not dividing the 
contract will be visible to the public. This makes it possible for both the Commission and 
national authorities to evaluate whether the lot division is seriously considered or whether the 
use of ‘cut and paste’ standard reasons suggests that there is an almost automated avoidance 
of the approach192. Also, this information allows Commission and national legislators to 
review whether Article 46.1 or the national implementation suffices to promote SME 
participation.  
 
The most striking conclusion is therefore that Article 46.1, might not be as efficient in 
promoting SMEs as intended, but is at least a step in the right direction towards promoting 
SME participation in public procurement.   
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